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Executive Summary
This paper examines the current state of the market for charter school finance and will focus specifically 
on programs and financing structures for school facilities. A review of existing research on charter school 
finance as well as a series of interviews with leading practitioners – from the public, private, and nonprofit 
sectors – reveals that:
•	 The	charter	school	industry	in	the	United	States	has	shown	tremendous	growth	in	the	past	fifteen	
years, with the numbers of schools and students enrolled in charter schools all having increased 
exponentially. To encourage the flow of capital from lenders and investors to charter schools, the 
public and private sectors have designed and implemented new subsidy programs – at the federal, 
state, and local levels – to stimulate new, creative financing structures.
•	 One	issue	that	has	hampered	schools’	ability	to	grow	is	the	lack	of	public	funding	and	private-
sector	involvement	in	facilities	financing	for	charter	schools.	Government	agencies	at	the	federal,	
state, and local levels have recently adopted policies to address this problem of inadequate access 
to capital. 
•	 Among	these	recent	policy	innovations	is	the	creation	of	the	United	States	Department	of	Educa-
tion’s Credit Enhancement for Charter Schools program, which provides full or partial guarantees 
(of principal and interest) to lenders whose funds are used to finance the construction or renova-
tion of facilities for charter schools. 
•	 Some	of	the	best	practices	for	facilities	financing	for	charter	schools	described	in	this	paper	
include: specialized underwriting tools, state intercept mechanisms, charter management 
organizations and development intermediaries, and moral obligation pledges by state and local 
governments.
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Background
The Charter school industry has undergone substantial growth since the early 1990s. Charter schools are 
publicly funded, privately managed schools that operate under a contract, or “charter,” with state-approved 
entities, such as school districts, county and state offices of education, and, in some states, state chartering 
boards, according to a report by the Low Income Investment Fund (LIIF).1 In 1992, Milo Cutter founded 
City Academy in Minnesota, the nation’s first charter school.2 As of April 2008, forty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia approved charter school laws for approximately 4,100 charter schools nationwide with an 
estimated 1.2 million students.3 
Charter school finance is a nascent but quickly growing industry, marked by participation from federal, 
state, and local government entities, as well as community banks, commercial and investment banks, and 
nonprofit organizations around the United States. Because charter schools are authorized at the state and 
local levels, there are considerable variations in the timing of states adopted charter school laws at different 
times and with different direct funding. Tables 1 and 2 list the first ten states and the most recent ten states 
(including the District of Columbia) to authorize charter schools; and also show the number of schools 
authorized:
Table 1 – States with Greatest Numbers of Charter Schools
 
  # of Schools in  Per Pupil Match  Year of State’s First 
  Academic  Rate for  Charter School Opening    
State  Year ’06-‘07  Operations  for Operations 
California*^!  621  69%  1993 
Arizona*  469  76%  1995 
Florida*  355  69%  1996 
Ohio^&  310  53%  1998 
Michigan  230  65%  1995 
Texas&  189  72%  1996 
Wisconsin  188  72%  1994 
Colorado*&  133  70%  1993 
Minnesota*  131  94%  1992 
Pennsylvania*  120  60%  1997 
*  State offers per pupil funding stream for facilities (per LISC 2007 charter school facilities landscape)
^  State has authorized some sort of grant funding for charter school facilities
!   State has publicly funded loan programs for charter schools
&  State offers some sort of credit enhancement program
**  In the above tables, the “Per Pupil Match Rate for Operations” is shown as a percentage (i.e. the percentage of 
funding allotted on a per pupil basis to students in charter schools as compared with funding allotted to district 
public school students).
Source: The Center for Education Reform429
Table 2 – States with Lowest Number of Charter Schools
   # of Schools    Year of State’s First 
    in Academic  Per Pupil Match  Charter School Opening      
  State  Year ’06-‘07  Rate for Operations  for Operations 
Mississippi  1  60%  1998 
Wyoming  3  51%  2002 
Virginia  3  60%  2001 
New Hampshire  8  37%  2004 
Iowa  9  77%  2004 
Rhode Island^  11  85%  1997 
Tennessee  12  94%  2003 
Oklahoma^  15  57%  1998 
Arkansas  16  64%  2000 
Connecticut^  16  71%  1997 
Source: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools5
The tables clearly show that the ten states with the country’s largest numbers of charter schools were “early 
adopters” of legislation authorizing charter schools. Another notable point from these data is the extent to 
which various states have approved programs to fund charter school facilities and operations. Of the ten 
states with the most charter schools, eight have at least one program to assist with facilities finance, includ-
ing grant or loan programs. However, of the ten schools with the fewest charter schools, only three had pro-
grams for charter school facilities financing. Some municipalities have emerged as more “charter friendly,” 
and the Table 3 below shows the cities that have the greatest number of students enrolled as a percentage of 
total enrollment.
^  State has authorized some sort of grant funding for charter school facilities30
Table 3 – Metro Area Data 
Community Charter Market Share Charter Non-Charter All
1. New Orleans, LA 57% 14,822 11,343 26,165
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5. Toledo, OH 18% 6,356 29,368 35,724
6. Chula Vista, CA
    Cleveland, OH
    Cincinnati, OH
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9. Minneapolis, MN 14% 5,854 36,337 42,191
10. Camden, NJ
      St. Paul, MN
      Philadelphia, PA
      Columbus, OH
      Vista, CA
      Saginaw, MI
      Mohave County, AZ
      Napa Valley, CA





































      Source: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools
Ray Budde, a professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, first suggested the idea for a “charter” 
school in 1988 and was a leading advocate for charter schools in the late 1980s and early 1990s.6 Budde’s 
paper “Education by Charter: Restructuring School Districts” outlined the steps that school districts and 
their administrators would need to take to implement charter schools locally.7 Another early advocate of 
charter schools was Albert Shanker, then president of the American Federation of Teachers, who suggested 
that schools or groups of teachers should be given a charter for a certain period of time: “The school could 
be evaluated to see the extent to which it met its goals, and the charter could be extended or revoked,” as 
noted by Finn and Vanourek (2007).8
Chester Finn (2000) chronicles the recent history of education reform in the United States, starting with 
President Lyndon Johnson approving the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which authorized 
greater funding for public schools. The thinking at the time was that more resources would lead to better 31
educational outcomes. Sociologist James Coleman, however, criticized the idea that more money for educa-
tion would necessarily lead to better outcomes. Coleman wrote that it was more important to shift “policy 
attention from inputs (per pupil expenditure, class size, teacher salaries, and so on) to a focus on outputs.” 
The focus on outputs helped in the evolution of charter schools: “We want to swap red tape for results and 
that would become the exact theory of charter schools,” according to Finn. 
Shober, Manna, and Witte (2006) also describe how the growth and development of charter schools was 
influenced by the movement toward accountability in education. The “need to hold schools and school 
districts accountable for academic performance challenged the local control prerogative.” And even though 
charter school laws vary by state, “all laws attempt to incorporate elements of flexibility and accountability. 
In exchange for considerable flexibility in operation and design of curriculum, pedagogy, and other aspects 
of running a school, charter operators agree to uphold certain standards of accountability through a written 
contract with an authorizing body.” 
The clear emphasis on evaluation and understanding performance at the school and student levels is linked 
to Ray Budde’s original ideas for how to design charter schools. Among the goals that Budde listed in his 
paper, “Education by Charter,” was to “establish a program/services monitoring and evaluation system not 
under the control of those whose programs and services are being monitored and evaluated.”9 Bryan Hassel 
(1998) further describes the value of accountability as it relates to the management and operation of charter 
schools: “Charter and voucher plans both hold schools accountable by giving families the choice of wheth-
er to have their children attend them. By tying funding to enrollment, both policies seek to induce schools 
to act in ways that families value. Those that fail to please families go out of business or are forced to rely 
on private tuition to support their operations.”10
The Charter School Facilities Problem
Few charter schools own their own facilities. Jill Levine, director of School Services at the Illinois Facilities 
Fund (IFF), a Chicago-based CDFI that offers extensive real estate and financial services to charter schools 
and their management, stated: “In starting a school, the trend is to lease space at first and then after at 
least three years begin thinking about ownership.”11 (Levine estimated that in Chicago, 16 percent of charter 
schools own their facilities.) According to the Educational Facilities Financing Center of the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation, lack of appropriate facilities is a major obstacle: “While the financing opportunities 
available to charter schools for their facilities are increasing, the sector remains fragmented, with individual 
providers having different eligibility requirements, financial products and geographic markets. Obtaining ac-
cess to financing is still difficult for smaller schools and those earlier in the charter school life cycle.12 
Charter schools do not have the direct taxing or bonding authority that traditional public schools use 
to pay for their facilities. According to Susan Harper of LIIF, “Most states still require charter schools to 
finance their start-up and facilities expenditures out of general operating revenues, privately raised funds, 
or partnerships with other organizations.”13 Thus, unlike conventional public schools, which generally issue 
bonds to finance their facilities with large institutional backing, charters have not been able to execute simi-
larly sized and rated transactions.14
From a financing standpoint, donors and lenders have perceived charter schools as highly risky because 
schools are often illiquid and lack operating history at the point when they need funds for operations or 
facilities. Although CDFIs are an important source of capital for charter school borrowers, Mary Tingerthal 
of the Housing Partnership Network noted that charter school loans are often too large for most CDFIs.15 
Also, schools often approach prospective lenders early in their operating history, when their creditworthi-
ness is at its lowest. Table 4 below lists the risk factors that interviewees mentioned and that have been cited 
in the literature on charter school facilities underwriting.32
Table 4 – Underwriting Risks
  Risk  Risk Type  Consequences                  Mitigating Factors 
  Charter Renewal  Operations  Default on hard debt;   Many states are lengthening charter terms
      legal settlement   (e.g. 15-Year Term in AZ and no renewal required in UT)
 
  Financial   Operations  Default on hard debt;  Use of state intercept mechanisms to wire funds
  Mismanagement    legal settlement  to bondholders or lenders; Increasingly savvy board    
        members and school management teams; use of 
        charter management organizations (CMOs) 
 
  Cost Overruns in   Operations/Facilities  Decrease in liquidity   Construction budgets for bonds financing charter school
  Facilities    and cash-on hand for   facilities include contingency reserve; use of DoE credit
  Construction    operating expenses  enhancement funds provides “first loss” position for 
        lenders on facilities projects; Use of Development
        Intermediaries (e.g. Civic Builders) to manage
        construction and rehab 
  Variation in Per Pupil   Policy  Decreases in Revenue   Use of credit enhancement funds from DoE program
  Match Levels    and Net Income  or other subsidies (e.g. NMTCs); As tax-exempt 
        organizations, schools can raise money through 
        donations 
  Competition for   Policy  Decreases in Revenue  School districts acting as “authorizer” of charter
 Student Enrollment     and Net Income  schools will support schools’ efforts to grow enrollment; 
  from School District      As tax-exempt organizations, schools can raise money 
        through donations 
  Instability in Capital   Market  Higher interest rates  CRA motivation for banks as lenders or investors;
  Markets    on bonds; Difficulty   Bond buyers are “high yield” funds and returns on
      for schools in obtaining   charter school bonds are high, despite low default
      financial guaranty   and delinquency rates
      insurance 
 
For underwriters who are experienced in community development finance but not necessarily with 
education, charter schools present risks that do not exist in deals financing housing or community facilities. 
The major concern among lenders who are considering adding loans and bond purchases for charter school 
facilities as a line of business is the risk presented by charter renewal by a local or state authorizing agency. 
In seeking permanent financing for their facilities, schools frequently request terms and amortizations for 
loans or bonds that exceed the school’s charter. Consider, for example, a school in Chicago that may have 
been allocated a five-year charter term and is requesting bond financing after two years of operations. The 
school approaches lenders for the renovation of an existing building and requests bond debt – through 501(c)
(3) bonds – with a term and amortization of fifteen years. For lenders, this situation poses substantial risks. If 
the school’s charter is not renewed in the fifth year, the source of repayment (per pupil revenues for school 
operations) will have been completely eliminated. In this scenario, a lender might be forced to foreclose on a 
charter school, which would be costly and have negative effects on the lender’s public relations image.
Today, however, lenders are more comfortable with reauthorization risk because the authorizing entities’ 
incentive is to ensure that students receive high-quality education, which means that schools that show 
improved student performance are likely to have their charters renewed. Additionally, to ease lenders’ 
concerns about reauthorization, state and local authorizing agencies are extending charter terms. Arizona, 
for example, now has a fifteen-year term for schools’ charters. This provides for longer terms and 
amortizations on loans and bonds without having to consider the reauthorization issue.33
Addressing the Problem
Given	the	scale	of	the	facilities	financing	problem	and	the	newness	of	this	field,	a	number	of	strategies	have	
been employed to pay for teaching space. One of the earliest approaches was the use of debt financing from 
CDFIs, according to Judith Kende, director of the New York region for LIIF.16 These funds were used for 
working capital as well as tenant improvements and facilities. Elise Balboni, vice president of Education 
Programs for the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, echoed that sentiment, stating that “CDFIs were a 
‘good fit’ as financiers of charter schools because they have a community focus and are located in low- and 
moderate-income communities.”17 Aside from debt made available by CDFIs, early schools relied on grant 
funds from foundations and wealthy philanthropists as well as retained earnings to fund program and facili-
ties expansion. Other financing tools as well have gained prominence in recent years.
Bonds
To date, charter schools have been able to receive debt financing for facilities from CDFIs, commercial 
banks, state and local government loan programs, and bond purchases by municipal bond funds. According 
to Russ Caldwell, senior vice president of D. A. Davidson, an investment bank based in Montana, commer-
cial or investment bankers did not address the issue of how to finance charter schools until 1995 or 1996, 
four years after the City Academy had opened its doors in Minnesota.18 
Caldwell began working on 501(c)(3) bond finance programs in the mid-1990s and has since completed 
approximately 85 bond issuances for charter schools, totaling $800 million in par value. According to 
Caldwell, between 350 and 400 schools (about 9 to 10 percent of all schools) have been able to complete 
bond financing to raise capital in transactions such as private placement or negotiated sale in the general 
market. Such bond financing provides a source of funds for schools to acquire or build out their existing 
facilities and make room for additional students. Mary Tingerthal, president of Capital Markets Companies 
for the Housing Partnership Network, said that bonds are a good finance fit because “charter schools tend 
to want long-term financing for their buildings, with the predictability of a fixed payment.”19
For these transactions, bonds are issued by a state or municipal authority and purchased by bond buyers as 
a negotiated sale or private placement. Thomas Nida, executive vice president for United Bank in Wash-
ington, D.C. and chairman of the D.C. Charter School Board, said that schools in D.C. make use of both 
structures.20 Robbins and Simonsen (1996) state, “Private placements avoid many of the regulatory require-
ments of bonds sold through typical competitive or negotiated sale mechanisms, because they are designed 
to be sold directly to one (or to very few) investor(s) who hold them until they mature (or are redeemed). 
This creates potential opportunities for reducing the costs associated with issuance and disclosure that make 
such sales a potential advantage, particularly in cases where credit quality is poor or issue size is small.”21 
Nida agreed that the lower transaction costs of a private placement make that structure appealing to 
schools, although he estimates that fewer than ten financial institutions in D.C. offer that product. Similar-
ly, Caldwell stated that the universe of bond buyers for negotiated sale bonds backed by charter schools is 
comprised of high-yield municipal bond funds, which total fewer than twenty firms as bond buyers. Charter 
school bonds are not yet an investment option for individual investors, according to Caldwell.22
Sophisticated management teams at some charter schools have also been able to obtain ratings for their 
publicly sold bonds. David Hitchcock, senior director at Standard and Poor’s (S&P), reported that its first 
rated, publicly sold bond deal involving charter schools was in 2001. By 2004, S&P had rated twenty-five 
bond deals for charter schools and seventy-nine bond transactions as of May 2008. Hitchcock reported that 
the median par value of the seventy-nine projects is $11.3 million. (Hitchcock noted that although seventy-
nine ratings are publicly available, S&P has conducted other ratings for bond issues. However, those ratings 
are not publicly released or the bonds are privately placed.) Additionally, Douglas Kilcommons, senior di-
rector at Fitch Ratings stated, “Bond issuance is absolutely increasing within the charter school sector, both 
in terms of the volume of transactions and the numbers of schools that have been able to receive invest-
ment grade paper.” Kilcommons credits the increase to more states becoming charter friendly; “Although 
there are more schools and the maturation of the industry correlates with an increase in sophistication in 
borrowing, the sector is still largely not well understood.”2334
Sample Transaction. One sample negotiated sale tax-exempt bond issuance was $17.9 million to finance a 
facility acquisition by Summit Academy, Inc., a Utah-based nonprofit organization that manages the Sum-
mit Academy charter school. The school was incorporated in Utah in 2003 and served 539 students at its 
opening for the 2004–5 academic year in grades K-6. For the 2007–8 school year, the school will serve 855 
students in grades K-8.24 As listed in the offering statement, the school’s income statements for fiscal years 
2005 through 2007 are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 – Summit Academy Income Statement Chart
This bond issuance allowed the school to raise a remarkably large amount of debt to finance the acquisition 
of its existing facility. The school was also able to retire existing debt from an acquisition loan on a nearby 
piece of land where the school will construct a second building to serve junior high school students. As 
the Official Statement described, “Upon completion, the [combined] facilities will be located on a total of 
approximately 12.46 acres of land, include a total of approximately 93,987 square feet of school building 
space and are expected to accommodate 1,000 students in Kindergarten through grade nine.” The sources 
and uses for the bonds are shown in Table 6.35
Table 6 – Summit Academy Sources and Uses 
As listed in the statement, the bond issuance had $17,795,000 in Series A tax-exempt charter school revenue 
bonds and $105,000 in Series B taxable charter school revenue bonds. Of the Series A bonds, $2.44 mil-
lion will be retired in June 2017 and the interest rate on that debt was 5.125 percent, while $15.36 million 
will be retired in June 2038 and its interest rate was 5.8 percent. The taxable portion of the bonds will be 
retired in June 2009 and bear interest at 7.5 percent. As the school builds out its new facility and expands its 
number of students, the debt service on the bonds is expected to be provided by net income from school 
operations; in addition, a significant debt service reserve has been built into the transaction. (Utah received 
grant	funds	from	the	Department	of	Education’s	State	Charter	School	Facilities	Incentive	Grants	Program	
from 2004 through 2006.) The Standard and Poor’s rating on these bonds was BBB- (the minimum invest-
ment-grade rating).
Department of Education Credit Enhancement Program
The Department of Education’s Credit Enhancement for Charter Schools program has been an effective 
tool for charters to improve their creditworthiness to investors. The organizations shown in Table 7 have 
been recipients of awards from the Department of Education program.36
Table 7 – Department Of Education Grantees List
Name of Awardee Year of Award Size of Award Geographic Focus
Building Hope 2002 $5MM National
California Charter Schools 
Association
2005 $10MM California






Civic Builders, Inc. 2008 $8.3MM New York, New Jersey
Community Loan Fund of New 
Jersey
2006 $8.15MM National
District of Columbia State 
Education Office
2004 $5MM DC
Housing Partnership Network 2007 $15MM National
Illinois Facilities Fund 2005; 2007 $8MM; $10MM IL, IN, MO, WI
Indianapolis Local Improvement 
Bond Bank
2005 $2MM Indiana
KIPP Foundation 2006 $6.8MM National
Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation
2003; 2006 $10MM; $8.2MM National




Michigan Public Educational 
Facilities Authority
2007 $6.5MM Michigan
NCB Capital Impact 2002; 2003 $10MM; $8MM
DE, DC, GA, FL, MN, NJ, NY, PA, 
VA, WI




The Reinvestment Fund 2005 $10MM PA, NJ, DE, MD, DC
Self-Help 2003; 2006 $8MM; $2.2MM National
Texas Public Finance Authority 2005 $10MM Texas
United States Department of Education – www.ed.gov37
Jim Houser, who oversees the program at the Department of Education, stated that the review of grant 
applications is based on a numerical scoring system by grant readers external to the department.25 The goal 
of the program is to leverage public dollars and provide incentives to private investors; grant funds can be 
used for guarantees for construction loans, leasehold improvement loans, and general facilities financing. 
Applicants are awarded extra points for their applications by serving communities with the greatest need 
for public school choice, which are typically those communities where the existing public schools are not 
performing well and large proportions of students come from low-income families. 
The grant funds are usually drawn down in full in a one-time payment in advance of using them and may 
be invested, which, Houser noted, is unusual for a federal program.26 The program is also unique in that 
the grant funds grow over time (through compounding interest) if the costs incurred, such as defaults on 
debt guaranteed through the grant, are less than the earnings on the investments. However, the program 
is subject to annual appropriations from the Department of Education, and total grant dollars diminished 
substantially between 2007 and 2008 (from $36.5 million awarded in 2007 to $8.3 million awarded in 
2008).27 Houser noted that the program grants are used by financial intermediaries, such as CDFIs, which 
are knowledgeable in trends in their local communities are aware of the needs of institutional investors.
Management and Finance Intermediaries
A growing trend in charter school operations and finance is the use of third-party intermediary organiza-
tions to facilitate the management of a school’s operations or the development, rehabilitation, or construc-
tion of its facilities. The use of third-party organizations, Charter Management Organizations (CMOs), for 
operations oversight and Development Intermediaries for development, rehabilitation, and construction 
for these purposes has improved the creditworthiness of schools. Lenders view a school’s financial manage-
ment as a key risk factor, according to Kende, but the use of a CMO for supervision of school operations 
can mitigate that risk.28 Craig Henderson, president of the board of directors of the Chicago International 
Charter Schools (CICS), a network of schools in the Chicago metropolitan area (and one of four founding 
members of the organization), agreed that having high-performing CMOs oversee a school helps convince 
prospective bond buyers of the creditworthiness of a school or network of schools.29 
Henderson notes that two factors aiding the performance of CMOs are: (1) the monitoring of CMOs by 
school management teams creates accountability for their performance; and (2) increased competition for 
expanding their own operations has created additional incentives for CMOs to excel in overseeing charter 
schools. Henderson, who is also the founder and president of a municipal bond money management firm, 
stated that CICS schools contract with third-party management organizations to improve operating ef-
ficiency, and from his experience, the use of charter management organizations at the twelve campuses of 
CICS has improved the network’s creditworthiness with institutional investors.
David Umansky, co-founder and CEO of Civic Builders, Inc., a nonprofit organization based in New York 
that acts as a real estate developer for charter schools, stated his organization’s general premise: “Charter 
schools should not be in the real estate business. Schools have financing and management challenges in 
dealing with real estate, which include managing, developing, and owning properties.”30 Acting as a de-
velopment intermediary, Umansky says, Civic Builders encourages lenders to compete by improving the 
creditworthiness of a charter school project, often through new construction or renovating an existing build-
ing. Civic Builders has completed three projects in New York City and has four projects in process. The 
organization was awarded the only grant from the U.S. Department of Education’s Credit Enhancement 
for Charter School Facilities program given in 2008; the geographic focus for the funds is New York and 
Newark, New Jersey.31
Another example of a third-party intermediary aiding schools in various capacities, including financial 
management, operations oversight, and real estate development advisor, is the Illinois Facilities Fund (IFF), 
based in Chicago. Jill Levine of IFF states that her organization “does anything and everything in schools’ 
financing.”32 She adds that IFF has helped charter schools with a full continuum of loan and bond financ-
ing products and also is available to help schools with the identification of buildings, sites, and leases, as 38
well as serving as a project manager and owner’s representative. IFF has used its grant funds from the De-
partment of Education’s Credit Enhancement Program for publicly sold bonds, and Levine said that bond 
investors have been encouraged by the strong relationship that charter school borrowers have built with 
IFF.
State Intercept Mechanisms
The state intercept mechanism is a practice that directs state or local agency per pupil funds directly to 
lenders (via trustees in bond deals) rather than paying the school first. In other words, with a state intercept 
mechanism, a state authorizing agency basically pays debt service, owed by schools, to lenders; the mecha-
nism literally “intercepts” a school’s operating or facilities revenues and places them in the hands of lenders 
(without involving the schools). The state intercept mechanism thus acts as a credit enhancement for lend-
ers or bond buyers concerned about the risk of financial mismanagement at schools (such as schools paying 
other operating expenses before hard debt). 
According to Douglas Kilcommons of Fitch Ratings, “The intercept mechanism helps ensure that the bond-
holder will receive timely principal and interest payments. This eliminates the risk that the school would use 
the bond proceeds for purposes other than paying principal and interest. State intercept mechanisms mean 
that bondholders get the ‘first cut’ of funds before the school does.”33 Nida of United Bank agreed that the 
state intercept mechanism, which has been put in place by Colorado and the District of Columbia, is a way 
to fix the issue of “cash flow risk.”34
Moral Obligation Pledge
The moral obligation pledge provides the backing of the state or municipal finance authority in a charter 
school bond sale and has been a significant credit enhancement for charters borrowing funds through nego-
tiated sale bonds. As of May 2008, only Colorado and Indiana had offered this pledge. 
In Colorado, the Moral Obligation Program “enhances the credit of a . . . charter school that has obtained 
an investment grade rating on a ‘stand alone’ basis,” according to the Colorado Department of the Trea-
sury.35 Under this program, charter schools that are able to obtain an investment-grade rating would have 
the balance sheet of the state of Colorado behind them in selling bonds to finance their facilities. 
The Moral Obligation Program, part of the School Finance Act of 2002, exemplifies an opportunity for 
states to use their strong financial position and provide credit enhancement to charter schools.36 As of June 
30, 2007, bond transactions for twenty-four schools in Colorado had participated in this program, receiving 
the financial “backing” of their state; the total par value of those bonds was nearly $300 million. Colorado 
funds its “debt reserve fund” for paying out principal and interest to bondholders in the event of default by 
a charter school by charging schools 10 basis points of the principal amount borrowed.
In Indiana, the legislature passed a law in 2002 to allow charter schools to obtain financing through the 
Indiana Bond Bank. According to the 2007 LISC Facilities Financing Report, “In addition to having access 
to these public authorities as conduit issuers, charter schools can benefit from the ‘moral obligation’ pledge 
of the City [of Indianapolis] or State [of Indiana], respectively, to debt issued through these authorities.”37 
This form of credit enhancement is helpful in “telling the story” of charter school bonds in Indiana to 
institutional investor since the state’s balance sheet is backing the bond sales. Additionally, the Department 
of Education awarded a $2 million grant from the Credit Enhancement Program to the Indianapolis Local 
Public Improvement Bond Bank to aid with funding for the state’s backing through its moral obligation 
pledge on charter school debt.
Underwriting Best Practices
Underwriting charter schools has become increasingly sophisticated, as financiers aim to understand the 
metrics that drive efficient school management and enrollment increases. Underwriting charter schools 
“vary from state to state and even district to district,” according to Mary Tingerthal. “New charter schools 
generally start with a ramp-up plan, making it tough to underwrite loans,” she said.38 39
Before joining United Bank, Thomas Nida grew the charter school loan portfolio of City First Bank of 
D.C., a CDFI based in Washington, D.C.39	While	at	City	First,	Nida	created	the	Charter	School	General	
Performance	Assessment	(“GPA”)	calculator,	which	has	since	become	a	standardized	evaluation	technique	
for analyzing finances and performance. As chairman of the D.C. Charter School Board, Nida has intro-
duced	the	GPA	calculator	to	staff	members,	and	the	tool	has	helped	standardized	the	evaluation	of	schools’	
performance	and	financial	metrics.	A	sample	worksheet	from	the	GPA	calculator	tool	is	shown	in	Table	8.
Table 8 – GPA Calculator 
As Jeremy Williams, finance manager of the D.C. Charter School Board, described, the tool creates a fi-
nancial score for charter schools on a 4-point scale. A high-performing school would receive an “A” or have 
a	GPA	that	exceeds	a	score	of	3.5;	underwriting	variables	are	weighed,	with	current	assets	and	cash	flows	
given added consideration.40	Williams	explained	that	a	school’s	“grade”	according	to	the	GPA	calculator	is	
based on its statement of financial position (the balance sheet for nonprofit organizations) and statement 
of activities (the income statement for nonprofit organizations). The D.C. Charter School Board’s goal is 
to modify the tool to integrate nonfinancial data such as number of teachers, staff turnover, student atten-
dance, and whether schools own or lease their facilities. Nida adds that the tool is available to lenders and 
CDFIs upon request.
In evaluating the financial performance of schools relative to their peers, the D.C. Charter School Board’s 
summary	metric	is	its	GPA.	From	a	school’s	statement	of	financial	position,	the	key	ratios	calculated	for	
the	purpose	of	formulating	a	GPA	score	are:	current	ratio,	fixed-assets	ratio,	capitalization	ratio,	and	debt-
to-worth ratio. On a school’s statement of activities, the ratios considered are: occupancy expense ratio, 
payroll and instruction ratio, and “other” expense ratio. In terms of its operations, the D.C. Charter School 






The D.C. Charter School Board also evaluates the amount of cash flow that schools generate annually as 
well as their overall profit margin. Cash flow is calculated as a dollar amount and it includes annual depre-
ciation and amortization expenses.40
Conclusion
The charter school industry in the United States has shown tremendous growth in the past fifteen years, 
with the number of schools, the number of states authorizing charter schools, and the number of students 
enrolled in charter schools all having increased substantially. The breadth of financial services available to 
charter schools has also expanded in this short time period. The public and private sectors have engineered 
new subsidy programs – at the federal, state, and local levels – and financing structures to encourage the 
flow of capital from lenders and investors to charter schools. As borrowers and recipients of funds via new 
structures, charter schools have used funds to support their day-to-day operations and acquire, expand, and 
develop their teaching facilities.
All of the interviewees for this paper were asked for their views of what the future holds for charter school 
finance. The overwhelming majority stated that bond activity for charter schools—the issuance of tax-
exempt and 501(c)(3) bonds—for facilities would continue to grow. To date, approximately 10 percent of the 
country’s charter schools have been able to complete a bond transaction. Many interviewees estimated that 
this percentage would grow substantially, and might possibly double, within the next five years. 
Interviewees agreed that the turmoil in the capital markets, which began in 2007, has put a strain on financ-
ing for charter schools. Investors have been wary of allotting resources toward “riskier” asset classes (and 
charters are still viewed by many capital markets investors as having a short track record), which has substan-
tially increased the pricing for loans and bonds to finance charter schools.
Although the current credit crisis appears to be far from over, charter schools have been steadily building 
their cases for creditworthiness. Through solid enrollment growth, increased per pupil revenues for charter 
schools, and on-time and under-budget delivery of school facilities, a growing number of investors are learn-
ing about the ability of charter schools to borrow and repay debt on time and without complications. As 
the economy recovers from the tumultuous state of the capital markets, many of those interviewed expect 
that securitization of charter school loans will grow tremendously in the next five or ten years.
Lenders have become increasingly comfortable with charter schools as borrowers as a result of the presence 
of third-party intermediaries, particularly for the management of operations and facilities development. 
The number of these intermediaries is also expected to grow in the near future, as they play a valuable role 
in “telling the story” of charter schools’ creditworthiness to lenders. Additionally, charter schools have seen 
improved operating efficiencies from joining and developing through networks of schools (for example, the 
Chicago International Charter Schools network in Chicago). Those interviewed for this paper largely agree 
that the percentage of all schools belonging to networks will grow, and it is likely that schools will be per-
mitted to “merge” with one another without having to revoke the charter of any merging schools. Approval 
of school mergers is expected to lower overhead costs for schools, which already operate on a lean budget.
Jonathan Kivell is a Community Development Officer for United Bank in Washington, DC.  He serves as Board Chair-
man of the Educated Consumer Project, a non-profit organization in DC, which is dedicated to providing financial 
literacy programs to high school students in low- and moderate-income communities.  Jonathan earned a B.S. cum laude 
from Cornell University and an MPP from Georgetown University.41
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